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Abstract
In contrast to the Copenhagen interpretation we consider quantumme-
chanics as universally valid and query whether classical physics is really
intuitive and plausible. - We discuss these problems within the quantum
logic approach to quantum mechanics where the classical ontology is re-
laxed by reducing metaphysical hypotheses. On the basis of this weak
ontology a formal logic of quantum physics can be established which is
given by an orthomodular lattice. By means of the Sole`r condition and
Piron’s result one obtains the classical Hilbert spaces. - However, this
approach is not fully convincing. There is no plausible justification of
Sole`r’s law and the quantum ontology is partly too weak and partly too
strong. We propose to replace this ontology by an ontology of unsharp
properties and conclude that quantum mechanics is more intuitive than
classical mechanics and that classical mechanics is not the macroscopic
limit of quantum mechanics.
1 The dualism of Copenhagen interpretation
Even today, 75 years after the discovery of quantum mechanics many quantum
physicists are convinced that the Copenhagen interpretation is still the right
way for understanding quantum physics. According to this interpretation we
have to distinguish two distinct worlds, the quantum world of microscopic en-
tities and the classical world of our everyday experience which is subject to
classical physics. In the quantum world we are confronted with many strange
features, complementarity, nonindividuality, nonlocality, and the loss of deter-
minism. However, the apparatuses which measure and register the properties
of the quantum system as well as the human observer, who reads the observed
data are parts of the classical world that is free from the quantum physical ab-
surdities mentioned. For describing and interpreting quantum physics we can
use common language and classical logic.
We will query this doctrine here for several reasons. Firstly, during the
last decades it became obvious that quantum mechanics is not restricted to the
microscopic world of nuclei, atoms, and molecules but can be applied also to
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macroscopic systems. The discovery of macroscopic quantum effects like super-
conductivity, superfluidity, macroscopic tunnelling, etc. are strong indications
that quantum physics holds also in the macroscopic world. Moreover, the suc-
cessful attempts to a quantum cosmology show that quantum mechanics can
even be applied on the cosmological level, to the problem of the creation of the
universe and to the universe as a quantum mechanical object. Hence it seems,
that there are no serious doubts today that quantum mechanics is universally
valid and can be applied to all objects from elementary particles to the entire
universe.
The second reason is presumably even more important. In the Copenhagen
interpretation quantum mechanics is considered to be less intuitive than classical
mechanics and sometimes paradoxical, whereas classical mechanics is assumed
to correspond to plausible reasoning and to intuitive results. This is, however,
not entirely correct. What we call “intuitive” and in accordance with “plausible
reasoning” corresponds to our everyday experience, to our pre-scientific expe-
rience in the macroscopic world. However, classical physics and in particular
classical mechanics is not exactly the theory of this pre-scientific experience.
Classical mechanics is loaded with many hypotheses which can be traced back
to the metaphysics of the 17th and 18th century. These metaphysical hypotheses
are without any empirical counterpart, they exceed clearly our everyday expe-
rience. As examples we mention here the existence of an absolute time, the
complete determination of objects, the strict causality law, and the law of con-
servation of substance. It is obvious that the consequences of these hypotheses
are not per se intuitive in the above mentioned sense.
In quantum mechanics we are confronted with a quite different situation.
Quantum mechanics may be understood as a theory of the physical reality
which is free from some of the metaphysical hypotheses mentioned, i.e. quan-
tum mechanics dispenses with some metaphysical exaggerations of the classical
theory. It is important to note that quantum mechanics can be obtained from
classical mechanics merely by reducing the ontological premises without incor-
porating new empirical components. This will be demonstrated in detail within
the framework of the quantum logic approach to quantum mechanics. Con-
sequently, in quantum mechanics just those parts of classical mechanics are
missing which are not intuitive and which do not correspond to plausible rea-
soning. This means that quantum mechanics is more intuitive than classical
mechanics – a result which is paradoxical at first glance. It is obvious that
this result together with the universal validity of quantum mechanics strongly
invalidates the dualistic approach of the Copenhagen interpretation.
2 Aiming a new quantum ontology
The ontology of a certain domain of physics contains the most general features
of the external reality which is treated in the physical domain in question. In
particular the ontology should contain the material preconditions for a prag-
matics which allows for the constitution of a scientific language and thus for the
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formulation of physical experience. The ontology which is underlying classical
mechanics will be called classical ontology and denoted by O(C). We will briefly
characterise this classical ontology.
According to O(C) there are individual and distinguishable objects Si and
these objects possess elementary properties Pλ in the following sense. An ele-
mentary property Pλ refers to a classical object system such that either Pλ or
the counter property P¯λ pertains to the system. An elementary property Pλ can
always be tested by measurement with the result that either Pλ or the counter
property P¯λ pertains to the object. Furthermore, objects are subject to the
law of “complete determination” according to which “if all possible predicates
are taken together with their contradictory opposites then one of each pair of
contradictory opposites must belong to it” [Kant, 1920]. Hence an object S
possesses each elementary property P either positive (P ) or negative (P¯ ). It
follows from these strong requirements that objects can be individualised by
elementary properties if impenetrability is assumed as an additional condition.
For objects of the external objective reality the causality law and the law of
conservation of substance hold without any restriction. Since there exist an ab-
solute and universal time which refers to all objects of the external reality, the
temporal development of these objects and their time dependent properties are
strictly determined by a causal law of nature which fulfils also the conservation
of substance.
There are important objections against this classical ontology. Since the
metaphysical and theological reasons of Newton are no longer relevant for a
justification of the ontology we have to search for alternative reasons. Are the
ontological assumptions intuitive and plausible in the sense mentioned above?
This is obviously not the case. The strict postulates of the classical ontology are
almost in accordance with our everyday experience, but the rigorousness of the
assumptions mentioned exceeds obviously the more qualitative and less rigorous
prescientific everyday experience. The strict causality law, the unrestricted
conservation of substance and the existence of one universal time are beyond
our daily experience. These and other hypotheses of the classical ontology must
not be considered as intuitive and plausible.
The second argument refers to the experimental evidence of the mentioned
hypothesis. There is no experimental indication that objects can always be
individualised and reidentified at later times, simply since experiments which
would confirm this assumption have never been performed in classical physics.
In addition, the principle of complete determination mentioned above has never
been tested with an accuracy which would allow to call the result a principle.
Consequently, there is no justification for a strict causality law such that the
present state of an object allows for predictions about all elementary properties.
Hence we find that there is no empirical justification for the classical ontology
O(C). Instead, the classical ontology is based on hypotheses whose origin can
be traced back to the metaphysics of the 17th and 18th century.
The classical ontology is neither intuitive and plausible nor is it justified
by experimental evidence. Moreover, – what is more important – the classical
ontology O(C) is not in accordance with quantum physics. A quantum me-
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chanical object system does not possess all possible elementary properties Pλ
either positive (Pλ) or negative (P¯λ). It is not carrier of all possible properties.
Instead, only a subset of all properties pertains to the system and can simulta-
neously be determined. These properties are often called “objective” properties
and they pertain to the object like in classical ontology. From these restrictions
it follows that in quantum mechanics no strict causality law can be established
and that object systems cannot be individualised and reidentified by means of
their objective properties.
We will not use here these empirical results for a reconstruction of an ontol-
ogy for quantum phenomena. However, we learn from these considerations, that
the classical ontology is not only based on classical metaphysics and partially
hypothetical, but that classical ontology contains too much structure and too
strong requirements compared with quantum physics. This observation offers
the interesting possibility to formulate the ontology O(Q) of quantum physics
by relaxing and weakening some hypothetical requirements of the classical on-
tology O(C). It is important to note that no new requirements must be added
to the assumptions of the classical ontology. Quantum ontology can thus be
formulated as a reduced version of the classical ontology O(C):
O(Q)-1: If an elementary property P pertains to a system as an objective property,
then a test of this property by measurement will lead with certainty to the
result P . In addition, any arbitrary elementary property P can be tested
at a given object with the result that either P or the counter property
P¯ pertains to the object system. (These requirements are in complete
accordance with O(C)).
O(Q)-2: Quantum objects are not completely determined. They possess only a
few elementary properties either positive or negative. Properties which
pertain simultaneously to an object are called “objective” and “mutually
commensurable”.
O(Q)-3: For quantum objects there is no strict causality law, simply since the
present state of an object system is never completely determined.
O(Q)-4: The lack of complete determination and of strict causality implies that
quantum objects cannot be individualised and reidentified at later times.
The mutual relations between classical and quantum ontology are the key for
the very intertheoretical relations between classical and quantum physics. This
will become obvious in the quantum logic approach to quantum mechanics when
quantum ontology is used as starting point for establishing a formal language
and logic of quantum physics. This way of reasoning will be made explicit in
the following section.
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3 The quantum logic approach to quantum me-
chanics
3.1 Language, semantics, and pragmatics
On the basis of the quantum ontology O(Q) described above we will establish
a formal language of quantum physics. Let S be a proper quantum system
and A,B, . . . elementary propositions which attribute predicates (properties)
P (A), P (B), . . . to system S at times t1, t2, . . . Hence, we write for elementary
propositionsA(S, t1), B(S, t2), . . . According to O(Q)-1 we assume that for every
elementary proposition A there exists a finite testing procedure which shows
whether P (A) pertains to S or not. If P (A) pertains to S at time t1 , then
the proposition A(S, t1) is called to be “true”, otherwise A(S, t1) is said to
be “false”. The assumption, that for every elementary proposition there is a
testing procedure which decides between “true” and “false” means, that these
propositions are “value definite”. Hence, an elementary proposition can either
be proved (with result A) or disproved (with result A¯), where A¯ is the counter
proposition of A. Furthermore, we assume that after a successful proof of A new
proof attempt leads with certainty to the same result, provided the time interval
between the two proof attempts is sufficiently small. This requirement is again
in accordance with O(Q)-1. Since after the first test the property P (A) pertains
objectively to the system and can thus be tested with the certain result P (A).
This assumption means that there are repeatable measurement processes, which
can be applied to the testing procedures. However, – and this is an important
restriction of O(C) – if after a successful proof of A, say, another proposition B
is proved, then a new proof attempt of A will in general not lead to the previous
result. Hence, we will not assume that two propositions A and B are in general
simultaneously decidable. If accidentally two propositions A and B are always
jointly decidable, we will call A and B “commensurable”. In this case, after the
proof attempt of B the result of the previous A-test is still available. However,
in the general case the result of a previous test is only restrictedly available.
On the basis of the set SQ
e of elementary propositions we introduce the
logical connectives by the possibilities to attack or to defence them, i.e. by
the possibilities to prove or to disprove the connective. Here, we consider the
sequential conjunction A ⊓ B (A and then B) which refers to two subsequent
instants of time t1 and t2 with t1 < t2 and the logical connectives ¬A ( not A),
A ∧ B (A and B), A ∨ B (A or B), and A→ B (if A then B) – which refer to
one simultaneous instant of time. The definitions of the sequential and logical
connectives by attack-and defence schemes can be illustrated most conveniently
by chronologically ordered proof trees. Correspondingly, in the proof tree of
the sequential conjunction A ⊓ B, the first branching point corresponds to a
A-test at t1, the second one to a B-test at t2. Note, that for the truth of A⊓B
the commensurability of A and B does not matter. However, for the proof
trees of the logical connectives, which refer to one simultaneous instant of time,
the commensurabilities of the elementary propositions play an important role.
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The concepts of truth and falsity of a compound proposition which is composed
by the connectives can then be defined by success and failure in a proof tree,
respectively. [Mittelstaedt, 1978; Stachow, 1980; Mittelstaedt, 1987].
Furthermore, we will define here binary relations between propositions. First,
the proof equivalence A ≡ B means that A can be replaced in any proof tree
of a compound proposition by B without thereby changing the result of the
proof tree. Second, the value equivalence A = B means that A is true (in the
sense of a proof tree) if and only if B is true. Third, the relation of implication
A ≤ B can be defined by A ≡ A ∧ B. Hence, the two implications A ≤ B and
B ≤ A imply the proof equivalence A ≡ B. Finally, we mention that A → B
is true if and only if A ≤ B holds. The full quantum language SQ can then
inductively be defined by the set SQ
e of elementary propositions and the con-
nectives mentioned. Together with the always true elementary proposition V,
the always false elementary proposition Λ, and the three relations one obtains
the language SQ.
3.2 Quantum logic
The semantics described here is a combination of a realistic semantics (for el-
ementary propositions) and a proof semantics (for connectives). Hence, the
truth of a compound proposition depends on the connectives contained in it as
well as on the elementary propositions and their truth values. However, there
are finitely connected propositions which are true in the sense of the semantics
mentioned, irrespective of the truth values of the elementary propositions con-
tained in it. These propositions are called formally true. – The precondition
that measurements are repeatable implies that A → A, the law of identity, is
formally true. The value definiteness of elementary propositions implies that
also finitely connected propositions are value definite and thus A∨¬A, the ter-
tium non datur law, is formally true. In a similar way, it follows that ¬(A∧¬A),
the law of contradiction, and (A ∧ (A → B)) → B, the modus ponens law, are
formally true. – Formally true propositions can also be expressed by “formally
true implications”. E.g. the modus ponens law reads A ∧ (A → B) ≤ B. In
addition, the relations A ≤ V and Λ ≤ A hold for all propositions A ∈ SQ.
The formal truth of a proposition A can then be expressed by V ≤ A. E.g. the
tertium non datur law reads V ≤ A ∨ ¬A .
There are two kinds of propositions A ∈ SQ. If a compound proposition
contains in addition to elementary propositions only the logical connectives
∧,∨,¬ and → , then it is called a “logical proposition”. In the more general
case, when the proposition contains also sequential connectives, in particular
the sequential conjunction ⊓ , then it is called a “sequential proposition”. In
addition to the formally true logical propositions mentioned above, there are
also formally true sequential propositions. If A and B are logical propositions
then A ∧ B ≤ A ⊓ B is a formally true implication. The totality of formally
true implications can be summarised in a calculus which contains “beginnings”
⇒ A ≤ B and rules A ≤ B ⇒ C ≤ D. Here, we distinguish the calculus LQ of
formally true logical propositions and the calculus SQ of formally true sequential
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propositions. [Mittelstaedt, 1978; Stachow, 1980].
For an algebraic characterisation of the calculi LQ and SQ we consider the
corresponding Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras. The Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of
the calculus LQ is given by a complete, orthomodular lattice LQ. Subsets of
mutually commensurable propositions constitute a Boolean sublattice LB ⊆ LQ
of the lattice LQ [Mittelstaedt, 1987]. Moreover, if the entire quantum language
SQ refers to one individual quantum system, then the lattice LQ is atomic and
fulfils the covering law [Stachow, 1984]. In this case we denote the lattice by L∗Q.
The Hilbert lattice LH of projection operators in Hilbert space can be obtained
from the lattice L∗Q by adding the Sole´r law, the meaning of which is, however,
still open [Sole´r, 1995]. Correspondingly, the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of
the calculus SQ of sequential quantum logic is given by a Baer
∗ semigroup.
[Stachow, 1980; Foulis,1960]. It is well known that by means of a result by
Piron [Piron, 1976] from the lattice LH the three classical Hilbert spaces can be
obtained and that for the complex numbers C quantum mechanics in Hilbert
space is achieved.
3.3 Is quantum mechanics a priori valid?
The described approach to quantum mechanics which starts from the relaxed
quantum ontology O(Q) and leads finally to the quantum mechanical Hilbert
space, is sometimes considered as an a priori justification of quantum theory
[Mittelstaedt, 1978]. The term “a priori” seems to be legitimated here, since the
starting point of this approach are the most general preconditions of a scientific
language of physics, i.e. the assumptions of the weak ontology O(Q). However,
this way of reasoning is not fully convincing. Firstly, up to now there is no
plausible and intuitiv justification of Sole´r’s law, which appears in the present
approach as an additional ad hoc assumption. Hence, one could ask whether
the quantum ontology O(Q) is really the right starting point. O(Q) is too weak,
since the main restriction of quantum ontology with respect to classical ontology,
the complementarity requirement, is a very strong postulate. Two properties
which are not commensurable for accidental reasons are complementary in the
sense that they cannot be tested simultaneously. Complementarity in this strong
form must be required in quantum mechanics for sharp observables which are
given by PV-measures.
However, even in quantum mechanics the strong complementarity require-
ment can be relaxed by the uncertainty principle making use of unsharp ob-
servables in the sense of POV-measures. POV-measures are the most general
observables which allow for a probability interpretation of quantum mechanics
[Busch et al. 1995]. Two unsharp properties of a quantum system can be at-
tributed jointly to the object, if the conveniently defined degrees of unsharpness
of the two properties fulfil the Heisenberg uncertainty inequality [Busch, 1985].
Obviously, a quantum ontology O(Qu) which replaces the complementarity re-
quirement by the uncertainty principle, is somewhat stronger than the original
ontology O(Q).
The ontologyO(Q) is not only too weak but – with respect to another feature
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– also too strong. In accordance with the classical ontology O(C) we assumed
in O(Q)-1 that any elementary property P can be tested experimentally with
the result that either P or the counter property P¯ pertains to the system. This
ontological precondition implies that elementary propositions of the quantum
language are value definite and that the tertium non datur holds in quantum
logic LQ . However, the ontological precondition that any elementary property
can be tested by experiment (with the result P or P¯ ) exceeds the possibilities
of Hilbert space quantum mechanics. Within the framework of the quantum
theory of unitary premeasurements it follows that pointer objectification cannot
be achieved for closed systems [Mittelstaedt 1998]. Hence, value definiteness of
elementary propositions is incompatible with quantum mechanics in Hilbert
space and must be relaxed in some sense. In this situation it suggests itself to
begin with elementary propositions that are not value definite and correspond
to unsharp properties given by POV-measures1 Hence it seems that also the
second objection against the quantum ontology O(Q) can be taken account of
by the quantum ontology O(Qu) based on unsharp properties.
Hence, on the basis of the slightly modified quantum ontology O(Qu) a fresh
start by means of unsharp properties seems to be a quite promising attempt. In
a first step of this approach a formal language and logic of not necessarily value
definite quantum mechanical propositions must be developed. In a second step
from the algebraic structure of the logic the algebra of effects and the Hilbert
space must be reconstructed. Hence one could either start from a language of
unsharp propositions or from a modified algebraic structure of quantum logic.
In recent years many interesting logical systems for unsharp propositions were
proposed. [Dalla Chiara 1993, 1994, 1995, Foulis 1997, Giuntini 1989, 1990,
Mittelstaedt 1978]
However, it is still an open question whether in this way a consistent opera-
tional approach to quantum mechanics can be obtained. Up to now the logical
systems mentioned were not yet reconstructed in an operational way starting
from a formal language of unsharp propositions. Furthermore, the Lindenbaum-
Tarski algebra of a logical calculus of unsharp propositions is not per se equiv-
alent to the algebra of effects in Hilbert space. We do not know which kind of
law must be added to the algebra of unsharp propositions in order to obtain the
effect algebra mentioned (it could be as complicated as the Sole´r law). Even
the last step of an operational foundation of quantum physics, the way from the
effect algebra to the Hilbert space requires more detailed investigations.
3.4 The ontological priority of quantum mechanics
Although the task of reconstructing quantum mechanics on the basis of a logic
of unsharp propositions is not yet finally performed, we can draw already some
interesting conclusions which refer to the interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics. The basis of this approach, the (uncertainty) ontology O(Qu) is somewhat
1It must be mentioned that up to now it is not yet quite clear whether the problem of
pointer objectification can completely be solved by POV-measures [Busch 1998].
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richer than the (complementarity) ontology O(Q) but weaker than the classical
ontology O(C) of complete determination. This classical ontology is not only
based on experience but also on several metaphysical hypotheses – which are
weakened or cancelled in O(Qu).
Since these metaphysical hypotheses (complete determination, individuality,
and full determinism) clearly exceed our everyday experience, and since we call
phenomena intuitive and understandable if they are in accordance with this
everyday experience, classical mechanics is not thoroughly intuitive. However,
since the hypotheses contained in the classical ontology O(C) are strongly re-
duced in the (uncertainty) ontology O(Qu) as well as in the (complementarity)
ontology O(Q), we expect that the implications of the quantum ontology O(Qu)
are more intuitive and more plausible than the implications from the classical
ontology.
In particular the quantum logic approach can further illustrate this result.
The logical systems which follow from the ontologies O(Q) and O(Qu) are based
on weaker and less hypothetical pragmatic preconditions than the Boolean lat-
tice LB of classical logic. Hence the resulting quantum mechanics is more intu-
itive and more plausible than classical mechanics. In addition, since quantum
mechanics is based on weaker premises than classical mechanics, it is nearer to
the “truth” than classical mechanics.
On the basis of these results we can formulate the roˆle of classical mechan-
ics. Firstly, classical mechanics is loaded with metaphysical hypotheses which
clearly exceed our everyday experience. Since quantum mechanics is based on
strongly relaxed hypotheses of this kind, classical mechanics is less intuitive and
less plausible than quantum mechanics. Hence classical mechanics, its language
and its logic cannot be the basis of an adequate interpretation of quantum me-
chanics. Secondly, classical mechanics is not the limit of quantum mechanics for
macroscopic phenomena. Since quantum mechanics of closed systems does not
explain the objectification, i.e. the classical behaviour of pointer values, classical
mechanics cannot be the macroscopic limit of quantum mechanics. However,
this argument which is still subject of controversial debates, is not the main
reason. The essential argument which shows that classical mechanics is not
the limiting case of quantum mechanics is based on the observation that clas-
sical mechanics is loaded with metaphysical hypotheses without any empirical
counterpart. Since some of these hypotheses are explicitly eliminated in quan-
tum theory, it is obvious that there is no approximation procedure which leads
from quantum mechanics to classical mechanics. Classical mechanics describes
a fictitious world which does not exist in reality.
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